Treasury Management Strategy Statement

and Annual Investment Strategy 2018-2019

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

> "The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

1.2 Reporting requirements

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies estimates and actuals.

An annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement (this report) – this is the first and most important report which is submitted to full Council before the start of the financial year. It covers:

- The capital plans (including prudential indicators)
- The treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- An investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are be to managed).

A mid-year Treasury Management Review Report – this will update Members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necesssary and whether any policies require revision. Monitoring reports are submitted to each Policy and Resources Committee.

An Annual Treasury Report – this provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

Capital Strategy

In December 2017, CIPFA issued revised Prudential and Treasury Management Codes. As from 2019-20, all local authorities will be required to prepare an additional report, a Capital Strategy report, which is intended to provide the following:

- a high-level overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability.

The aim of this report is to ensure that all elected Members on the full council fully understand the overall strategy, governance procedures and risk appetite entailed by this Strategy.

The Capital Strategy will include capital expenditure, investments and liabilities and treasury management in sufficient detail to allow all Members to understand how stewardship, value for money, prudence, sustainability and affordability will be secured.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2018/19

The strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and Scottish Government Investment Regulations.

1.4 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny (Audit and Scutiny Committee).

The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

1.5 Treasury management advisors

The Council uses Link Asset Services (perviously known as Capita) as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

The Council also recognises their responsibility for treasury management decisions and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

2 CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2018/19 – 2020/21

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist Members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.1 Capital Expenditure and Financing

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of the 2018/19 budget setting.

The table below summarises the capital expenditure plans as outlined within the proposed capital plan 2018-20.

Capital Expenditure £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Community Services	0	17,860	5,403	1,927	0
Argyll and Bute HSCP	0	901	354	0	0
Customer Services	13,613	5,884	1,309	1,687	0
Development and Infrastructure Services	12,248	33,747	10,122	9,590	14,884
Live Argyll	0	1,207	98	0	0
Unallocated Capital	1,200	0	0	0	13,000
Total	**27,061**	**59,599**	**17,286**	**13,204**	**27,884**

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how capital or revenue resources are financing them. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need. (The financing need excludes other long-term liabilities, such as PFI and leasing arrangements, which already include borrowing instruments.)

Capital Expenditure £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Total Capital Expenditure	27,061	59,599	17,286	13,204	27,884
Financed by:					
Capital Receipts	1,830	6,182	3,100	250	0
Capital Grants	11,375	13,938	12,024	14,564	18,000
Capital Reserves					
Revenue	229	12,329	2,721	6,274	0
Net Financing need for the year	**13,627**	**27,150**	**-559**	**-7,884**	**9,884**

2.2 The Council's Overall Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as prudent annual repayments from revenue need to be made, called the Loan Fund Principal Repayment, which reflect the useful life of capital assets financed by borrowing. This charge reduces the CFR each year. From 1 April 2016, authorities may choose whether to use scheduled debt amortisation, (loans pool charges), or another suitable method of calculation in order to repay borrowing.

The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has £74m of such schemes within the CFR.

The CFR projections are noted in the table below.

£'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Capital Financing Requirement					
Opening CFR	253,896	253,483	318,341	307,709	289,725
Closing CFR	253,483	318,341	307,709	289,725	289,383
Movement in CFR	**-413**	**64,858**	**-10,632**	**-17,984**	**-342**
Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	13,627	77,150	-559	-7,884	9,884
Less scheduled debt Amortisation	14,040	12,292	10,073	10,100	10,226
Movement in CFR	**-413**	**64,858**	**-10,632**	**-17,984**	**-342**

2.3 Core funds and expected investment balances

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources £'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Expected Investments	**63,722**	**60,000**	**50,000**	**40,000**	**30,000**

2.4 Limits to Borrowing Indicators

Operational Boundary: The operational boundary is the expected maximum borrowing position of the Council during the year, taking into account the timing of various funding streams and the recharge of principal repayments from the revenue account. Periods where the actual position varies from the boundary are acceptable subject to the authorised limit not being breached.

Operational Boundry **£'m**	**2016/17** **Actual**	**2017/18** **Estimate**	**2018/19** **Estimate**	**2019/20** **Estimate**	**2020/21** **Estimate**
Debt	179	203	194	173	172
Other long term liabilities	80	130	128	126	124
Total	**259**	**333**	**322**	**299**	**296**

Authorised Limit: The authorised limit represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited. This limit is set by Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desirable, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. This is the statutory limit (Affordable Capital Expenditure Limit) determined under section 35 (1) of the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

Authorised Limit **£'m**	**2016/17** **Actual**	**2017/18** **Estimate**	**2018/19** **Estimate**	**2019/20** **Estimate**	**2020/21** **Estimate**
Debt	184	208	199	178	177
Other long term liabilities	83	133	131	129	127
Total	**267**	**341**	**330**	**307**	**304**

2.5 Statutory repayment of loans fund advances

The Council is required to set out its policy for the statutory repayment of loans fund advances prior to the start of the financial year. The repayment of loans fund advances ensures that the Council makes a prudent provision each year to pay off an element of the accumulated loans fund advances made in previous financial years.

A variety of options are provided to Councils so long as a prudent provision is made each year. The Council is recommended to approve the following policy on the repayment of loans fund advances:

For loans fund advances made before 1 April 2016, the policy will be to maintain the practice of previous years and apply the **Statutory Method**, with all loans fund advances being repaid in equal instalments of principal/ by the annuity method.

For loans fund advances made after 1 April 2016, the policy for the repayment of loans advances will be either the:

1. **Statutory method** – loans fund advances will be repaid in equal instalments of principal by the annuity method (up to 31 March 2021).

The Council is permitted to use this option for a transitional period only, of five years until 31 March 2021, at which time it must change its policy to use alternative approaches based on depreciation, asset life periods or a funding/income profile; or

2. **Funding / Income profile method** – loans fund advances will be repaid by reference to an associated income stream (after 31 March 2021).

The annuity rate applied to the loans fund repayments was based on historic interest rates and is currently 4.423%. However, under regulation 14 (2) of SSI 2016 No 123, the Council has reviewed and re-assessed the historic annuity rate to ensure that it is a prudent application. The result of this review suggests that a revised annuity rate of 4.423% is still applicable.

2.6 Affordability prudential indicators

These prudential indicators assess the affordability of the capital investment plans and provide an indication of the impact of capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The cost impact of borrowing decisions are reflected in the Council's loan charges.

a. Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long-term liabilities net of investment income) against the net revenue stream. The estimates of the financing costs include current commitments and those arising from the capital programme.

%	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Ratio	7.66%	7.93%	6.79%	6.36%	6.36%

b. Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the capital programme recommended in the budget compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are only published annually at this time.

£	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Council tax - band D	27.13	54.09	-1.12	-15.69	19.68

2.7 Treasury Indicator for Debt

The purpose of this indicator is to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if this is set to be too restrictive it will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/ improve performance. The indicator is "Maturity structure of borrowing". These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicator and limits.

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2018/19		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0%	30%
12 months to 2 years	0%	30%
2 years to 5 years	0%	30%
5 years to 10 years	0%	40%
10 years to 20 years	0%	80%
20 years to 30 years	0%	80%
30 years to 40 years	0%	80%
40 years to 50 years	0%	80%
Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2018/19		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0%	30%
12 months to 2 years	0%	30%
2 years to 5 years	0%	30%
5 years to 10 years	0%	30%
10 years to 20 years	0%	30%
20 years to 30 years	0%	30%
30 years to 40 years	0%	30%
40 years to 50 years	0%	30%

The interest rate exposure in respect of the Council's external debt will be monitored on an ongoing basis by keeping the proportion of variable interest rate debt at an appropriate level given the total amount of external debt and the interest rate environment within which the Council is operating. When interest rates are increasing the Council will look to move to fixed rate borrowing and if interest rates are likely to fall then the level of variable rate borrowing will be increased to minimise future interest payments.

3 TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of approporiate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current portfolio position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2017, with forward projections, are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£'000	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
External Debt					
Debt as 1st April	170,502	179,823	192,223	183,223	168,223
Change in Debt (In Year)	9,321	12,400	-9,000	-15,000	2,000
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL) at 1st April	74,059	72,182	120,247	118,239	116,122
Change in OLTL (In Year)	-1,877	48,065	-2,008	-2,117	-2,268
Actual gross debt at 31st March	**252,005**	**312,470**	**301,462**	**284,345**	**284,077**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**253,483**	**318,341**	**307,709**	**289,725**	**289,383**
Under / (Over) borrowing	**1,478**	**5,871**	**6,247**	**5,380**	**5,306**

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2018/19 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not taken for revenue purposes.

The Head of Strategic Finance reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

3.2 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives Link Asset Services view on its prospects for interest rates.

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB View	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB View	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

Link Asset Services have also provided commentary in relation to interest rates and this is included within Appendix 2.

3.3 Investment and borrowing rates

Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.

Borrowing interest rates increased sharply after the result of the general election in June and also after the September Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting when financial markets reacted by accelerating their expectations for the timing of Bank Rate increases. Apart from that, there has been little general trend in rates during the current financial year. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when we may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt.

There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.4 Borrowing strategy

Over the past few years, the Council has benefits from lower borrowing costs due to low interest rates, in particular utilisation of short term temporary borrowing and internal borrowing (use of existing cash).

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2018/19 treasury operations. Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate committee at the next available opportunity. In normal circumstances the main sensistivies of the forecast are likely to be the two scenarios noted below. The Head of Strategic Finance, in conjunction with the treasury advisors, will continually monitor both the prevailing interest rates and the market forecasts, adopting the following responses to a change of scenarios.

- If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.

- If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding would be taken whilst interest rates are lower than they would be projected to be in the next few years.

3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than, or in advance of, its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sum borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

3.6 Debt rescheduling

At this time, and due to the early repayment penalities imposed by PWLB, there are limited opportunities for debt rescheduling. However, this position will be kept under regular review.

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the appropriate Committee at the earliest meeting following its action.

4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

4.1 Investment policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the Scottish Government's Investment (Scotland) Regulations, (and accompanying Finance Circular), and the 2011 revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes, ("the CIPFA TM Code"). **The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second and then return.**

In accordance with guidance from the Scottish Government and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector and the Council will enage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on the market.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

4.2 Investment Counter-Parties MiFID II

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is the EU legislation that regulates firms who provide services to clients linked to "financial instruments" (shared, bonds, units in collective investment schemes and derivative), and the venues where those instruments are traded. The new MiFID II became effective on 3 January 2018.

Under the new regime, Local Authorities were automatically deemed "retail" clients by default. Argyll and Bute exercised their option to "opt-up" to "professional" client status and had to meet qualitative and quantitative test criteria for individual organisations.

Opting up has meant that the Council is still able to access a full range of investment products and services (some organisations only work with professional clients).

4.3 Creditworthiness policy

The Council recognises the vital importance of credit-worthiness checks on the counterparies is uses for investments.

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparies are supplemented with further credit overlays to provide a colour coded system based on recommended durational bands for use of the counter-party.

The Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings, from all three agencies and using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue consideration to just one agency's rating.

The Link Asset Service creditworthiness services is used on an advisory basis, with the decision on creditworthiness ultimately resting with the Treasury Team.

Further information on credit worthiness policy and assessment is provided within Appendix 6.

4.4 Country and sector limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch. The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 7. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

4.5 Investment strategy

Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.50% until quarter 4 2018 and not to rise above 1.25% by quarter 1 2021. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2017/18 0.50%
- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.00%
- 2020/21 1.25%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

2017/18	0.40%
2018/19	0.60%
2019/20	0.90%
2020/21	1.25%
2021/22	1.50%
2022/23	1.75%
2023/24	2.00%
Later years	2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

4.6 Investment treasury indicator and limit

These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit:

Maximum principal sums invested > 364 & 365 days			
£m	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	**2020/21**
Principal sums invested > 364 & 365 days	20	20	20

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access and notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days).

4.7 Investment risk benchmarking

This Council will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 7 day LIBID uncompounded.

4.8 End of year Investment Report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

4.9 Policy on the Use of External Service Providers

The Council uses Link Asset Services as its external management advisors. The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Authority at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed opon external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing extenal providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed, documented and subjected to regular review.

5 APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Treasury Management Policy Statement

This organisation defines its treasury management activities as: "The management of the authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks".

This organisation regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organisation, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.

This organisation acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management."

The policy in respect of borrowing and investments is to minimise the cost of borrowing and maximise investment returns commensurate with the mitigation of risk.

Appendix 2 – Interest Rate Forecasts and Commentary Provided by Link Asset Services (at 16.01.18)

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
3 Month LIBID	0.40%	0.40%	0.40%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.70%	0.90%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%
6 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%
12 Month LIBID	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%
Bank Rate													
Link Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.75%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	2.00%	2.00%	2.25%	2.25%	-
5yr PWLB Rate													
Link Asset Services	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%
Capital Economics	1.70%	1.90%	2.10%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.40%	2.65%	2.65%	2.90%	-
10yr PWLB Rate													
Link Asset Services	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%
Capital Economics	2.20%	2.40%	2.60%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	2.80%	3.05%	3.05%	3.30%	-
25yr PWLB Rate													
Link Asset Services	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%
Capital Economics	2.60%	2.90%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.30%	3.35%	3.35%	3.35%	3.60%	3.60%	3.80%	-
50yr PWLB Rate													
Link Asset Services	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%

As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long-term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Fed. has taken the lead in reversing monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts (and MPC decisions) will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- The Bank of England takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Germany is still without an effective government after the inconclusive result of the general election in October. In addition, Italy is to hold a general election on 4 March and the anti EU populist Five Star party is currently in the lead in the polls, although it is unlikely to get a working majority on its own. Both situations could pose major challenges to the overall leadership and direction of the EU as a whole and of the individual respective countries. Hungary will hold a general election in April 2018.
- The result of the October 2017 Austrian general election has now resulted in a strongly anti-immigrant coalition government. In addition, the Czech ANO party became the largest party in the October 2017 general election on a platform of being strongly against EU migrant quotas and refugee policies. Both developments could provide major impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a major block to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the Euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer-term PWLB rates include:

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.

Appendix 3 – Economic Background Provided by Link Asset Services (at 16.01.18)

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution.**

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and may soon start in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income,** which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift *UP* in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.2% (+2.0% y/y) and quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.7% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting MPC. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in September and is expected to rise slightly in the coming months.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

It therefore looks likely that the MPC will increase Bank Rate to 0.5% in November but, if not, in February 2018. The big question after that will be whether this will be a one off increase, followed by a long delay before the next increase, or the start of a slow, but regular, series of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards. Towards the end of October, short sterling rates are indicating that financial markets do not expect a second increase until November 2018 with a third increase in August 2019 i.e. a slow pace of increases. However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would have added reason to embark on an ongoing series of slow but gradual increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 - 34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **many consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate once they start. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EU. Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.5% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y) and 0.6% in quarter 2 (2.3% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in September inflation was 1.5%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has started forward guidance on its intentions to start slowing down the amount of monthly QE purchases of debt but has not yet set a timeframe for this or the pace.

USA. Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1%, resulting in an overall annualised figure of 2.1% for the first half year. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.2%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017, which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its $4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50

- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU’s budget, voting allocations and policies.

Appendix 4 - Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) Permitted Investments

Commentary provided by Link Asset Services.

This Council approves the following forms of investment instrument for use as permitted investments as set out in table 1.

Treasury risks
All the investment instruments in tables 1 and 2 are subject to the following risks: -

- **Credit and counter-party risk:** this is the risk of failure by a counterparty (bank or building society) to meet its contractual obligations to the organisation particularly as a result of the counterparty's diminished creditworthiness, and the resulting detrimental effect on the organisation's capital or current (revenue) resources. There are no counterparties where this risk is zero although AAA rated organisations have the highest, relative, level of creditworthiness.

- **Liquidity risk:** this is the risk that cash will not be available when it is needed. While it could be said that all counterparties are subject to at least a very small level of liquidity risk as credit risk can never be zero, in this document, liquidity risk has been treated as whether or not instant access to cash can be obtained from each form of investment instrument. However, it has to be pointed out that while some forms of investment e.g. gilts, CDs, corporate bonds can usually be sold immediately if the need arises, there are two caveats: - a. cash may not be available until a settlement date up to three days after the sale b. there is an implied assumption that markets will not freeze up and so the instrument in question will find a ready buyer. The column in tables 1 / 2 headed as 'market risk' will show each investment instrument as being instant access, sale T+3 = transaction date plus 3 business days before you get cash, or term i.e. money is locked in until an agreed maturity date.

- **Market risk:** this is the risk that, through adverse market fluctuations in the value of the principal sums an organisation borrows and invests, its stated treasury management policies and objectives are compromised, against which effects it has failed to protect itself adequately. However, some cash rich local authorities may positively want exposure to market risk e.g. those investing in investment instruments with a view to obtaining a long term increase in value.

- **Interest rate risk**: this is the risk that fluctuations in the levels of interest rates create an unexpected or unbudgeted burden on the organisation's finances, against which the organisation has failed to protect itself adequately. This authority has set limits for its fixed and variable rate exposure in its Treasury Indicators in this report. All types of investment instrument have interest rate risk except for the following forms of instrument which are at variable rate of interest (and the linkage for variations is also shown): - (Capita Asset Services note – please specify any such instruments should you use them)

- **Legal and regulatory risk:** this is the risk that the organisation itself, or an organisation with which it is dealing in its treasury management activities, fails to act in accordance with its legal powers or regulatory requirements, and that the organisation suffers losses accordingly.

Controls on treasury risks

- **Credit and counter-party risk:** this authority has set minimum credit criteria to determine which counterparties and countries are of sufficiently high creditworthiness to be considered for investment purposes. See paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4.

- **Liquidity risk:** this authority has a cash flow forecasting model to enable it to determine how long investments can be made for and how much can be invested.

- **Market risk:** this authority purchases Certificates of Deposit (CD's), as they offer a higher rate of return than depositing in the DMADF. They are usually held until maturity but in exceptional circumstances, they can be quickly sold at the current market value, (which may vary from the purchase cost), if the need arises for extra cash at short notice. Their value does not usually vary much during their short life.

- **Interest rate risk**: this authority manages this risk by having a view of the future course of interest rates and then formulating a treasury management strategy accordingly which aims to maximise investment earnings consistent with control of risk or alternatively, seeks to minimise expenditure on interest costs on borrowing. See paragraph 4.5.

- **Legal and regulatory risk:** this authority will not undertake any form of investing until it has ensured that it has all necessary powers and also complied with all regulations. All types of investment instruments

Unlimited investments

Regulation 24 states that an investment can be shown in tables 1 and 2 as being 'unlimited' in terms of the maximum amount or percentage of the total portfolio that can be put into that type of investment. However, it also requires that an explanation must be given for using that category.

The authority has given the following types of investment an unlimited category: -

- **Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility.** This is considered to be the lowest risk form of investment available to local authorities as it is operated by the Debt Management Office which is part of H.M. Treasury i.e. the UK Government's sovereign rating stands behind the DMADF. It is also a deposit account and avoids the complications of buying and holding Government issued treasury bills or gilts.

- **High credit worthiness banks and building societies.** See paragraph 4.3 for an explanation of this authority's definition of high credit worthiness. While an unlimited amount of the investment portfolio may be put into banks and building societies with high credit worthiness, the authority will ensure diversification of its portfolio ensuring that no more than £10m of the total portfolio can be placed with any one institution or group at any one time.

Objectives of each type of investment instrument

Regulation 25 requires an explanation of the objectives of every type of investment instrument which an authority approves as being 'permitted'.

Deposits

The following forms of 'investments' are actually more accurately called deposits as cash is deposited in an account until an agreed maturity date or is held at call.

- **Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility.** This offers the lowest risk form of investment available to local authorities as it is effectively an investment placed with the Government. It is also easy to use as it is a deposit account and avoids the complications of buying and holding Government issued treasury bills or gilts. As it is low risk it also earns low rates of interest. However, it is very useful for authorities whose overriding priority is the avoidance of risk. The longest period for a term deposit with the DMADF is 6 months.

- **Term deposits with high credit worthiness banks and building societies.** See paragraph 4.2 for an explanation of this authority's definition of high credit worthiness. This is the most widely used form of investing used by local authorities. It offers a much higher rate of return than the DMADF (dependent on term). The authority will ensure diversification of its portfolio of deposits ensuring that no more than £10m of the total portfolio can be placed with any one institution or group. In addition, longer term deposits offer an opportunity to increase investment returns by locking in high rates ahead of an expected fall in the level of interest rates. At other times, longer term rates can offer good value when the markets incorrectly assess the speed and timing of interest rate increases. This form of investing therefore, offers a lot of flexibility and higher earnings than the DMADF. Where it is restricted is that once a longer term investment is made, that cash is locked in until the maturity date.

- **Call accounts with high credit worthiness banks and building societies.** The objectives are as for 1b. but there is instant access to recalling cash deposited. This generally means accepting a lower rate of interest than that which could be earned from the same institution by making a term deposit. Some use of call accounts is highly desirable to ensure that the authority has ready access to cash when needed to pay bills.

- **Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits).** This line encompasses ALL types of structured deposits. There has been considerable change in the types of structured deposits brought to the market over the last few years, some of which are already no longer available. In view of the fluidity of this area, this is a generic title for all structured deposits so as to provide councils with greater flexibility to adopt new instruments as and when they are brought to the market. However, this does mean that members ought to be informed as to what instruments are presently under this generic title so that they are aware of the current situation, and that they are informed and approve of intended changes in an appropriate manner.

- **Collateralised deposits.** These are deposits placed with a bank which offers collateral backing based on specific assets. Examples seen in the past have included local authority LOBOs, where such deposits are effectively lending to a local authority as that is the ultimate security.

DEPOSITS WITH COUNTERPARTIES CURRENTLY IN RECEIPT OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT / OWNERSHIP

These banks offer another dimension of creditworthiness in terms of Government backing through either partial or full direct ownership. The view of this authority is that such backing makes these banks attractive institutions with whom to place deposits, and that will remain our view if the UK sovereign rating were to be downgraded in the coming year.

- **Term deposits with high credit worthiness banks which are fully or semi nationalised.** As for 1b. but Government full, (or substantial partial), ownership, implies that the Government stands behind this bank and will be deeply committed to providing whatever support that may be required to ensure the continuity of that bank. This authority considers that this indicates a low and acceptable level of residual risk.
- **Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits).** This line encompasses ALL types of structured deposits. There has been considerable change in the types of structured deposits brought to the market over the last few years, some of which are already no longer available. In view of the fluidity of this area, this is a generic title for all structured deposits so as to provide councils with greater flexibility to adopt new instruments as and when they are brought to the market. However, this does mean that members ought to be informed as to what instruments are presently covered under this generic title so that they are aware of the current situation, and that they are informed and approve of intended changes in an appropriate manner.

COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES STRUCTURED AS OPEN ENDED INVESTMENT COMPANIES (OEICS)

- **Government liquidity funds.** These are the same as money market funds (see below) but only invest in government debt issuance with highly rated governments. Due to the higher quality of underlying investments, they offer a lower rate of return than MMFs. However, their net return is typically on a par with the DMADF, but with instant access.

- **Money Market Funds (MMFs).** By definition, MMFs are AAA rated and are widely diversified, using many forms of money market securities including types which this authority does not currently have the expertise or capabilities to hold directly. However, due to the high level of expertise of the fund managers and the huge amounts of money invested in MMFs, and the fact that the weighted average maturity (WAM) cannot exceed 60 days, MMFs offer a combination of high security, instant access to funds, high diversification and good rates of return compared to equivalent instant access facilities. They are particularly advantageous in falling interest rate environments as their 60 day WAM means they have locked in investments earning higher rates of interest than are currently available in the market. MMFs also help an authority to diversify its own portfolio as e.g. a £2m investment placed directly with HSBC is a 100% risk exposure to HSBC whereas £2m invested in a MMF may end up with say £10,000 being invested with HSBC through the MMF. For authorities particularly concerned with risk exposure to banks, MMFs offer an effective way of minimising risk exposure while still getting much better rates of return than available through the DMADF.

- **Ultra short dated bond funds.** These funds are similar to MMFs, can still be AAA rated but have variable net asset values (VNAV) as opposed to a traditional MMF which has a Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV). They aim to achieve a higher yield and to do this either take more credit risk or invest out for longer periods of time, which means they are more volatile. These funds can have WAM's and Weighted Average Life (WAL's) of 90 – 365 days or even longer. Their primary objective is yield and capital preservation is second. They therefore are a higher risk than MMFs and correspondingly have the potential to earn higher returns than MMFs.

- **Gilt funds.** These are funds which invest only in U.K. Government gilts. They offer a lower rate of return than bond funds but are highly rated both as a fund and through investing only in highly rated government securities. They offer a higher rate of return than investing in the DMADF but they do have an exposure to movements in market prices of assets held.

- **Bond funds.** These can invest in both government and corporate bonds. This therefore entails a higher level of risk exposure than gilt funds and the aim is to achieve a higher rate of return than normally available from gilt funds by trading in non-government bonds.

SECURITIES ISSUED OR GUARANTEED BY GOVERNMENTS

The following types of investments are where an authority directly purchases a particular investment instrument, a security, i.e. it has a market price when purchased and that value can change during the period the instrument is held until it matures or is sold. The annual earnings on a security is called a yield i.e. it is normally the interest paid by the issuer divided by the price you paid to purchase the security unless a security is initially issued at a discount e.g. treasury bills..

- **Treasury bills.** These are short term bills (up to 12 months, although none have ever been issued for this maturity) issued by the Government and so are backed by the sovereign rating of the UK. The yield is higher than the rate of interest paid by the DMADF and another advantage compared to a time deposit in the DMADF is that they can be sold if there is a need for access to cash at any point in time. However, there is a spread between purchase and sale prices so early sales could incur a net cost during the period of ownership.

- **Gilts.** These are longer term debt issuance by the UK Government and are backed by the sovereign rating of the UK. The yield is higher than the rate of interest paid by the DMADF and another advantage compared to a time deposit in the DMADF is that they can be sold if there is a need for access to cash at any point in time. However, there is a spread between purchase and sale prices so early sales may incur a net cost. Market movements that occur between purchase and sale may also have an adverse impact on proceeds. The advantage over Treasury bills is that they generally offer higher yields the longer it is to maturity (for most periods) if the yield curve is positive.

- **Bond issuance issued by a financial institution which is explicitly guaranteed by the UK Government e.g. National Rail.** This is similar to a gilt due to the explicit Government guarantee.

- **Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt) denominated in Sterling**. As for gilts but issued by other nations. Use limited to issues of nations with at least the same sovereign rating as for the UK.

- **Bonds issued by Multi Lateral Development Banks (MLDBs).** These are similar to c. and e. above but are issued by MLDBs which are typically guaranteed by a group of sovereign states e.g. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

SECURITIES ISSUED BY CORPORATE ORGANISATIONS

The following types of investments are where an authority directly purchases a particular investment instrument, a security, i.e. it has a market price when purchased and that value can change during the period the instrument is held until it is sold. The annual earnings on a security is called a yield i.e. is the interest paid by the issuer divided by the price you paid to purchase the security. These are similar to the previous category but corporate organisations can have a wide variety of credit worthiness so it is essential for local authorities to only select the organisations with the highest levels of credit worthiness. Corporate securities are generally a higher risk than government debt issuance and so earn higher yields.

a. **Certificates of deposit (CDs).** These are shorter term securities issued by deposit taking institutions (mainly financial institutions). They are negotiable instruments, so can be sold ahead of maturity and also purchased after they have been issued. However, that liquidity can come at a price, where the yield could be marginally less than placing a deposit with the same bank as the issuing bank.

b. **Commercial paper.** This is similar to CDs but is issued by commercial organisations or other entities. Maturity periods are up to 365 days but commonly 90 days.

c. **Corporate bonds.** These are (long term) bonds (usually bearing a fixed rate of interest) issued by a financial institution, company or other non-government issuer in order to raise capital for the institution as an alternative to issuing shares or borrowing from banks. They are generally seen to be of a lower creditworthiness than government issued debt and so usually offer higher rates of yield.

d. **Floating rate notes.** These are bonds on which the rate of interest is established periodically with reference to short-term interest rates.

OTHER

Property fund. This is a collective investment fund specialising in property. Rather than owning a single property with all the risk exposure that means to one property in one location rising or falling in value, maintenance costs, tenants actually paying their rent / lease etc, a collective fund offers the advantage of diversified investment over a wide portfolio of different properties. This can be attractive for authorities who want exposure to the potential for the property sector to rise in value. However, timing is critical to entering or leaving this sector at the optimum times of the property cycle of rising and falling values. Typically, the minimum investment time horizon for considering such funds is at least 3-5 years.

Table 1: permitted investments in house – Common Good

This table is for use by the in house treasury management team.

1.1 Deposits

	* Minimum Credit Criteria / colour banding	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	--	term	no	100	2 years
Term deposits – local authorities	--	term	no	100	2 years
Call accounts – banks and building societies	Green	instant	no	100	Call
Term deposits – banks and building societies	Green	term	no	100	2 years
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities: - Structured deposits.	Green	term	no	50	2 years
Collateralised deposit (see note 1)	UK sovereign rating	term	no	50	1 year

Note 1. As collateralised deposits are backed by e.g. AAA rated local authority LOBOs, this investment instrument is effectively a AAA rated investment

1.2 Deposits with counterparties currently in receipt of government support / ownership

	* Minimum Credit Criteria / colour banding	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
UK part nationalised banks	Blue	term	no		1 Year
Banks part nationalised by high credit rated (sovereign rating) countries – non UK	UK Sovereign Rating	term	no		1 Year
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities: - Structured deposits	Green	term	yes		1 Year

1.3 Collective investment schemes structured as Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs)

	* Minimum Fund Rating	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
1. Government Liquidity Funds	AAA	instant	No see note 1	100	1 Year
2a. Money Market Funds CNAV	AAA	instant	No see note 1	100	1 Year
2b. Money Market Funds LVNAV	AAA	T+1 to T+5	No see note 1	100	1 Year
2c. Money Market Funds VNAV	AAA	T+1 to T+5	No see note 1	100	1 Year
3. Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.25	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	100	1 Year
4. Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.5	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	100	1 Year
5. Bond Funds	AAA	T+2 or longer	yes	100	1 Year
6. Gilt Funds	AAA	T+2 or longer	yes	100	1 Year

Note 1. The objective of MMFs is to maintain the net asset value but they hold assets which can vary in value. However, the credit rating agencies require the fluctuation in unit values held by investors to vary by almost zero.

1.4 Securities issued or guaranteed by governments

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Treasury Bills	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+1	yes	100	1 Year
UK Government Gilts	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+1	yes	100	1 Year
Bond issuance issued by a financial institution which is explicitly guaranteed by the UK Government e.g. National Rail	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+3	yes	100	1 Year
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA	Sale T+1	yes	80	1 Year
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	Sale T+1	yes	80	1 Year

1.5 Securities issued by corporate organisations

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Certificates of deposit issued by banks and building societies	Green	Sale T+0	yes	50	2 Years
Commercial paper other	Green	Sale T+0	yes	20	2 Years
Floating rate notes	Green	Sale T+0	yes	20	2 Years
Corporate Bonds other	Green	Sale T+3	yes	20	2 Years

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

1.6 Other

	* Minimum Credit Criteria / fund rating	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Property funds	--	T+4	yes	100	5 Years

Table 2: permitted investments for use by external fund managers – Common Good

2.1 Deposits

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Term deposits – local authorities	--	term	no	100	2 Years
Call accounts – banks and building societies	Green	instant	no	100	Call
Term deposits – banks and building societies	Green	term	no	100	2 Years
Collateralised deposit	UK sovereign rating	term	no	50	1 Year

2.2 Deposits with counterparties currently in receipt of government support / ownership

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
UK part nationalised banks	Blue	Term or instant	no	100	1 Year
Banks part nationalised by high credit rated (sovereign rating) countries – non UK**	UK sovereign rating	Term or instant	no	100	1 Year

If forward deposits are to be made, the forward period plus the deal period should not exceed one year in aggregate.

2.3 Collective investment schemes structured as Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs)

	* Minimum Fund Rating	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
1. Government Liquidity Funds	AAA	instant	No see note 1	**100**	**1 Year**
2a. Money Market Funds CNAV	AAA	instant	No see note 1	**100**	**1 Year**
2b. Money Market Funds LVNAV	AAA	T+1 to T+5	No see note 1	**100**	**1 Year**
2c. Money Market Funds VNAV	AAA	T+1 to T+5	No see note 1	**100**	**1 Year**
3. Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.25	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	**100**	**1 Year**
4. Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.5	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	**100**	**1 Year**
5. Bond Funds	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	**100**	**1 Year**
6. Gilt Funds	AAA	T+1 to T+5	yes	**100**	**1 Year**

Note 1. The objective of these funds is to maintain the net asset value but they hold assets which can vary in value. However, the credit rating agencies require the fluctuation in unit values held by investors to vary by almost zero.

2.4 Securities issued or guaranteed by governments

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Treasury Bills	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+1	yes	100	1 Year
UK Government Gilts	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+1	yes	100	1 Year
Bond issuance issued by a financial institution which is explicitly guaranteed by the UK Government e.g. National Rail	UK sovereign rating	Sale T+3	yes	100	1 Year
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA	Sale T+1	yes	80	1 Year
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	Sale T+1	yes	80	1 Year

2.5 Securities issued by corporate organisations

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Liquidity risk	Market risk	Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Certificates of deposit issued by banks and building	Green	Sale T+1	yes	**50**	
Commercial paper other	Green	Sale T+1	yes	50	
Corporate Bonds other	Green	Sale T+3	yes	20	
Floating Rate Notes	Green	Sale T+1	yes	20	

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

Appendix 5 – Treasury Management Practice (TMP2) Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

The following table is for use by the Treasury Team and is a list of current counterparties. However, the use of counterparties depends on credit ratings and the Council may stop using certain counterparties and may stop using certain counterparties and/or decide to use alternative counterparties within its permitted investments. If for unavoidable short term operation reasons, limits are breached this will be communicated to management immediately.

The Monitoring of Investment Counterparties - The status of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating and market information from Capita Asset Services, including when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Head of Strategic Finance, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
Cash type instruments				
a. Deposits with the Debt Management Account Facility (UK Government) (**Very low risk)**	This is a deposit with the UK Government and as such counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Deposits can be between overnight and 6 months.	Little mitigating controls required. As this is a UK Government investment the monetary limit is unlimited to allow for a safe haven for investments.	£unlimited, maximum 6 months.	£unlimited, maximum 6 months.
b. Deposits with other local authorities or public bodies **(Very low risk)**	These are considered quasi UK Government debt and as such counterparty risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Liquidity may present a problem as deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties can apply. Deposits with other non-local authority	Little mitigating controls required for local authority deposits, as this is a quasi UK Government investment. Non- local authority deposits will follow the approved credit rating criteria.	£unlimited, maximum 1 year.	£unlimited, maximum 1 year.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
	bodies will be restricted to the overall credit rating criteria.			
c. Money Market Funds (MMFs) **(Low to very low risk)**	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where the MMFs has a “AAA” rated status from either Fitch, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s.	£10m per fund	100%
d. Ultra short dated bond funds **(low risk)**	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where the have a “AAA” rated status from either Fitch, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s.	£10m	100%
e. Call account deposit accounts with financial institutions (banks and building societies) **(Low risk depending on credit rating)**	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is high and investments can be returned at short notice.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’sDay to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.
f. Term deposits with financial institutions (banks and building societies) **(Low to medium risk depending on period & credit rating)**	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is low and term deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties may apply.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
g. Government Gilts and Treasury Bills **(Very low risk)**	These are marketable securities issued by the UK Government and as such counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, although there is potential risk to value arising from an adverse movement in interest rates (no loss if these are held to maturity.	Little counterparty mitigating controls are required, as this is a UK Government investment. The potential for capital loss will be reduced by limiting the maximum monetary and time exposures.	£10m maximum 1 year.	100% maximum 1 year.
h. Certificates of deposits with financial institutions **(Low risk)**	These are short dated marketable securities issued by financial institutions and as such counterparty risk is low, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. There is risk to value of capital loss arising from selling ahead of maturity if combined with an adverse movement in interest rates (no loss if these are held to maturity). Liquidity risk will normally be low.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	£10m per counterparty maximum 1 year.	20% maximum 1 year.
i. Structured deposit facilities with banks and building societies (escalating rates, de-escalating rates etc.) **(Low to medium risk depending on**	These tend to be medium to low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is very low and investments can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty (penalties may apply).	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
period & credit rating)				
j. Corporate bonds **(Medium to high risk depending on period & credit rating)**	These are marketable securities issued by financial and corporate institutions. Counterparty risk will vary and there is risk to value of capital loss arising from selling ahead of maturity if combined with an adverse movement in interest rates. Liquidity risk will be low.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. . Corporate bonds will be restricted to those meeting the base criteria. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	£5m and maximum 1 year.	£20% and maximum 1 year.
Other types of investments				
a. Investment properties	These are non-service properties which are being held pending disposal or for a longer term rental income stream. These are highly illiquid assets with high risk to value (the potential for property prices to fall or for rental voids).	In larger investment portfolios some small allocation of property based investment may counterbalance/compliment the wider cash portfolio. Property holding will be re-valued regularly and reported annually with gross and net rental streams.	£10m	20%.
b. Loans to third parties, including soft loans	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Member approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default.	£10m and maximum 5 years.	10% and maximum 5 years.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
c. Shareholdings in a local authority company	These are service investments which may exhibit market risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each equity investment in a local authority company requires Member approval and each application will be supported by the service rational behind the investment and the likelihood of loss.	50%	20%
d. Non-local authority shareholdings	These are non-service investments which may exhibit market risk, be only considered for longer term investments and will be likely to be liquid.	Any non-service equity investment will require separate Member approval and each application will be supported by the service rational behind the investment and the likelihood of loss.	5%	100%
e. Loans to third parties as part of the Council's Empty Homes Strategy	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Head of Strategic Finance approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default. Each funding request will be accompanied by financial projections and be subject to an assessment of the project and borrower.	£1.5m and a maximum of 10 years.	N/A
f. Loans to third parties as part of the Council's SHF Front Funding Facility	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Head of Strategic Finance approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default. Each funding request will be accompanied by financial projections and be subject to an assessment of the project and borrower.	£5m and a maximum of 3 years.	N/A

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good Limits
g. Loans to third parties as part of the Council's Long Term Loan Funding to RSL's	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Head of Strategic Finance approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default. Each funding request will be accompanied by financial projections and be subject to an assessment of the project and borrower.	£5m and a maximum of 30 years.	N/A
h. Hub Co sub debt	These are non-service investments which may exhibit market risk, be only considered for longer term investments and will be likely to be highly illiquid.	Any non-service equity investment will require separate Member approval and each application will be supported by the service rational behind the investment and the likelihood of loss.	£10m	N/A

Appendix 6 – Creditworthiness policy

Service and Information provided by Link Asset Services

This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings

Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit rates, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration of investments.

All credit ratings are monitored from a weekly list which can be updated daily by Link Asset Services. The Council is alerted to the changes to ratings of all three agencies through the use of Link Asset Services credit worthiness service.

If a downgrade rsults in the counterparty/investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, immediate consideration will be given to whether funds should be withdrawn from this counterparty and the timescale for doing this.

In addition to the use of the credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via Link Asset Service's Passport website that the Council can access. Extreme market movements may result in a downgrade of an institution or removal from the Councils lending list.

Based on the Link Asset Services approach, the Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

Yellow	5 years*
Dark pink	5 years for Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.25
Light pink	5 years for Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.5
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 days
No colour	Not to be used

*The yellow colour category is for UK Government debt, or its equivalent, money market funds and collateralised deposits where the collateral is UK Government debt.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that supporting government.

No more than £10m can be invested with any single counterparty. The Council will place overnight and call deposits with the Council's bankers irrespective of credit rating. The limit on placing deposits with the Council's bankers is currently £2m.

The Council can invest an unlimited amount of money I the Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility (operated by the Debt Management Office which is part of HM Treasury). The longest period for a term deposit with the DMADF is 6 months.

Appendix 7 – Approved Countries for Investments (at 16.01.18)

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Capita Asset Services credit worthiness service.

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

AA-

- Belgium
- Qatar

Appendix 8 – Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation

The Council

- Overall responsibility for Treasury Management Strategy.
- Adoption of Treasury Policy Statements.
- Receive an Annual Report and other reports on the Treasury Management Operation and on the exercise of delegated treasury management powers.

The Policy and Resources Committee

- Responsibility for the overall investment of money under the control of the Council.
- Keeping under review the level of borrowing.
- Approval of Annual Strategy Statement.
- Receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities.
- Approval of Treasury Policy Statements.
- Implementation and monitoring of Treasury Management Policies and Practices.

The Audit and Scrutiny Committee

- Review the overall internal and management control framework related to the treasury function.
- Review internal and external audit reports related to treasury management.
- Review provision in the internal and external audit plans to ensure there is adequate audit coverage of treasury management.
- Monitor progress with implementing recommendations in internal and external audit reports.
- Reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

Appendix 9 – The Treasury Management Role of the Section 95 Officer

The Head of Strategic Finance:

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance.
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports.
- Suubmitting budgets and budget variations.
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports.
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function.
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit.
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Reviewing and considering risk management in terms of treasury activities.

The nominated Elected Member (Policy Lead for Strategic Finance and Capital):

- Acting as spokesperson for treasury management.
- Taking a lead for elected Members in overseeing the operation of the treasury function.
- Review the treasury management policy, strategy and reports.
- Support and challenge the development of treasury management.